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Abstract   Current poverty measurement methodology does not allow a 
definitive analysis of changes in distribution, through time or between countries, 
which involve changes in the number or proportion of poor people. By re-
opening some of the discussion which has taken place around the incidence, 
intensity and inequality aspects of poverty, and by revisiting the continuity and 
transfer axioms, we show that the Bourguignon and Fields poverty index allows 
considerable ethical flexibility when its parameters are used to full advantage. 
Significantly, a fourth dimension of poverty, the injustice of it, corresponding 
closely with Rawls’s concern for the least advantaged, can also be admitted into 
the picture once the poverty aversion parameter in the Bourguignon and Fields 
index is fully understood and used appropriately. A novel application leads to a 
perspective upon the entire class of relative poverty indices which has not been 
seen before, and also generates both potentially interesting new poverty indices 
and wider scope for cogent measurement. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Different poverty indices can exhibit startlingly different behaviours in response to the simplest of 
distributional changes. How can this be? In this paper, we re-examine a number of assumptions that 
have become conventional in poverty analysis, relating to continuity at the poverty line and what 
happens (or should happen) when people cross this line. Our findings provide illumination for such 
different behaviours, and, we hope, will give encouragement as well as added flexibility to analysts 
coping with real-world measurements where the number and/or proportion of poor people differs 
between distributions being compared. We frame our discussion around Sen’s “three ‘I’s of poverty” 
which have become highly influential - namely the incidence, intensity and inequality dimensions of 
aggregate poverty. From this reconsideration also emerges a possible “fourth ‘I’ of poverty”, hence the 
title of our paper.  
 Sen’s (1976) development of his poverty index is motivated by the need for a poverty index to 
be adequately informative on the situation of the poor. Sen values the informative content inherent in 
the headcount ratio (H) and in the income-gap ratio (I), and asserts that “Both should have some role in 
the index of poverty” (p. 223). The proportion of poor individuals in a society provides information 
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about the incidence of poverty. The extent to which poor incomes fall short from the poverty line gives 
indications about the intensity of poverty. However, except in the unlikely case of a perfectly 
egalitarian income distribution below the poverty line - Axiom N in Sen (1976) - the use of H and I 
alone is challenged on the ground of their “crudeness”. The blame is on the silence about how incomes 
- or, equivalently, poverty shortfalls - are distributed among the poor. Such considerations motivated 
Sen to develop a “composite measure P” able to “take note of the inequality among the poor” where “G 
[the Gini coefficient of the poor] provides this information” (p. 227).  
 Various distribution-sensitive indices have been subsequently proposed in the literature, 
replacing the rank-order weighting used by Sen with other ways to take into account inequality below 
the poverty line. For example, the well-known parametric Pα  class (Foster et al., 1984, henceforth 
FGT) when 2α =  adopts 2pC  - the squared coefficient of variation of poor incomes - while for 0α =  
and 1α =  it corresponds to H and HI respectively. Thanks to the incorporation of 2pC , 2Pα =  “indeed 
may be expressed as a combination of this inequality measure, the headcount ratio and the income-gap 
ratio in a fashion similar to Sen (1976)” (p. 761). 1 
 From the above, it should come as no surprise that only distributional-sensitive indices are 
affected by disequalizing distributional changes which leave the incidence and intensity of poverty 
unaltered - for example, with H and I staying the same, the Sen index and 2Pα =  increase. But if we 
wonder which behaviour we should expect from poverty indices that are informative on all three ‘I’s, 
there is definitely something more interesting to say. Two closely interrelated lines of investigation are 
opened, which we pursue in this work. 
 On the one hand, how is it possible that different composite measures respond in different ways 
to distributional changes affecting the ‘I’s of poverty? For example, consider an income distribution 
among 6 persons, y = ($4, $7, $8, $9, $20, $30), and a poverty line of Z = $10. Now the poorest person 
gives $1 to the one with $9, and the incomes become y' = ($3, $7, $8, $10, $20, $30). As an outcome of 
that regressive transfer, the Sen index falls while 2Pα =  increases. We shall show how the Bourguignon 
and Fields (1997), henceforth BF, class of indices can be a tool allowing the accommodation of a rich 
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array of value judgements in response to the question in Kundu and Smith (1983): “How should 
poverty indices behave with respect to transfers which alter the size of the poor population?” (p. 430). 
 On the other hand, the need for a deeper understanding of the real meaning of the three ‘I’s as 
well as the need for them to be complemented with a fourth ‘I’ emerges clearly from the following 
simple numerical example. Consider a transfer in which the second poorest person in distribution y = 
($4, $7, $8, $9, $20, $30) gives $1 to the one with $8, and the incomes become y" = ($4, $6, $9, $9, 
$20, $30). In the new distribution, the incidence and intensity of poverty are the same whilst the 
inequality has increased. It looks natural that the composite measure 2Pα =  increases. Suppose now that 
from distribution y the second poorest gives $2 to the one with $8 and $1 to the one with $9, and the 
incomes become y"' = ($4, $4, $10, $10, $20, $30). Still, the intensity of poverty has remained the 
same but both the incidence of poverty and the inequality among the poor have evidently decreased. 
How come that 2Pα =  tells us that poverty has increased? Moreover, Pα →∞  would rank equally 
distributions y and  y"'. Given that for α  increasing indefinitely the customary three ‘I’s become 
virtually irrelevant, which is the ‘I’ informing such a comparison? 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the value judgements which  
underpin the axioms for continuity, discontinuity and regressive transfers which are used in the poverty 
literature. In Section 3, we examine what happens when someone crosses the poverty line as the result 
of a regressive transfer in the case of the BF index. Minor adaptations provide the additional degree of 
ethical flexibility we have spoken of. In Section 4, we make the case for a fourth ‘I’ of poverty; also, by 
carefully interpreting the relevance of the ‘inequality’ of poverty, we are led to draw a parallel with the 
approach known as ‘prioritarianism’ in social justice theory. In Sections 5 and 6, the analytical tools 
developed earlier in the paper are jointly employed for a deeper understanding of the workings not only 
of the FGT and BF classes but also of all relative poverty indices, as to their distributional properties, 
their encapsulation of the four ‘I’s of poverty and their prioritarian stance; a potentially interesting new 
class of indices comes as a natural outcome. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Value judgements: crossings of the poverty threshold 
The attractiveness of a ‘smooth’ poverty function rests in the idea that “given a very small change in a 
poor person’s income, we could not expect a huge jump in the poverty level” (Zheng, 1997, p. 131). 
But should that hold also at the poverty line? While for Watts (1968) “poverty is not really a discrete 
condition. One does not immediately acquire or shed the afflictions we associate with the notion of 
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poverty by crossing any particular poverty line” (p. 325), Donaldson and Weymark (1986) do argue 
that the practical difficulties in measuring income make continuity a reasonable requirement, but 
acknowledge that “..on the other hand, the use of a poverty line to sharply demarcate the rich from the 
poor suggests, but does not require, that a poverty index might be discontinuous at the poverty line” (p. 
674). 
 BF see two distinct aspects to the social welfare losses due to lack of adequate income. One 
arises simply because people are poor, in the sense that their income level does not allow them to fulfil 
the “accepted conventions of minimum needs” (Sen, 1979: 291). The other reflects the consideration 
that poverty becomes harsher the further the individual’s income falls below the poverty line. 
Therefore, BF suggest that i), a desirable function should take into account the continuous aspect of the 
welfare loss from poverty - they choose to focus upon the FGT class but hint at other distribution 
sensitive measures for this – and ii), for each poor individual, a constant δ  should be added by virtue 
of his condition of being poor. In their own words, “a ‘fixed loss’ from poverty … arises in addition to 
the income-dependent ‘variable loss’ from poverty” (p. 158). However BF make no recommendation 
about the precise magnitude of the fixed loss - i.e. the parameter δ - which “must be set by the 
observer” (p. 158). If the absoluteness of poverty in capabilities space (Sen, 1982) is accepted, then 
something highly significant indeed happens when an income unit crosses the poverty line. The last 
penny given to a poor person – the one which lifts him out of poverty – must then have a 
disproportional effect compared to the other pennies given. Continuity at the poverty line would make 
it impossible to accommodate this value judgement. Indeed, then, continuous indices are built upon the 
rejection of the notion of absoluteness of poverty in capabilities space, and upon the belief that 
reaching the poverty line does not provide any ‘highly significant’ social welfare gain.2 
 As a consequence, continuity ensures that a distribution-sensitive index increases as the result of 
any regressive transfer, even though the recipient may be taken out of poverty. We will name such a 
requirement the unrestricted transfer axiom, which for the ease of expression will be denoted by UTA; 
RTA will instead be used to refer to the restricted transfer axiom, according to which only those 
                                                 
2
 Lewis and Ulph (1988) argue for a jump discontinuity in utilitarian welfare at the poverty line, in a microeconomic model 
with an indivisible participation good, one unit of which, if affordable, takes away the shame of poverty – and causes a 
jump in indirect utility. For these authors, welfare a lB Atkinson (1970) becomes WF = U(:F) - [U(:F) - I04 U(x)f(x)dx] - 
g.H(F|Z) in which there are subtractions from the pure size measure U(:F) for the costs of inequality and poverty 
respectively. For Lewis and Ulph, in fact, “none of the writers who have tried to incorporate the distribution of income 
amongst the poor into their measure of poverty have adequately explained why this feature of income distribution should 
matter when measuring poverty (as distinct from inequality)” (ibid., page 119).  
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regressive transfers in which the recipient remains poor necessarily increase poverty. There is a 
fundamental difference in the intuition behind these two. The principle informing UTA is immediate 
and appealing: a transfer from a poor individual to a less poor one is always a bad thing. The 
satisfaction of RTA instead suggests the idea that “a reduction of the number of the poor might under 
certain circumstances compensate a rise in the extent of penury of those who remain below the poverty 
line” (Sen, 1982: 33). In order to complete the picture, we introduce an alternative property, which we 
call the ‘rescue axiom’, denoted by RA, which calls for a decrease in poverty as the result of any 
regressive transfer lifting the recipient out of poverty. To the advocates of RA, for whom the only tool 
currently available in the literature is the ‘crude’ headcount, crossing the poverty threshold is always a 
good thing.  
 Whether a decrease in the number of poor individuals at such a cost should be welcomed or not 
is surely a troublesome issue. Discussing anti-poverty budgetary exercises, Subramanian (1997) throws 
a parallelism with the ‘lifeboat dilemma’ proposed by utilitarian philosophers which would well suit a 
discussion in which poverty is seen as a welfare loss from inadequate income. The issue under study is 
a good candidate for membership of the well-known “class of human problems which can be called ‘no 
technical solution problems’” (Hardin, 1968: 1243). 
 Our business is not to look for an ultimate solution where there is none, but to provide technical 
solutions accommodating different plausible value judgements. We investigate comprehensively the 
possibilities for a poverty index to respond to crossings of the poverty line as the result of regressive 
transfers, and we do it in tandem with the analysis of the case for a poverty index to be continuous or 
jump-discontinuous at the poverty line. The FGT class Pα  and the BF class ,Pα δ  represent an ideal field 
of investigation for the analytics of these issues, being respectively continuous and jump-discontinuous 
at the poverty line. As will be seen, the appropriate choice of the parameter δ  in the BF class allows 
the accommodation of UTA, RTA or RA within a composite measure, which is monotonic and convex 
in the poor sub-domain, and which does not suffer from any ‘crudeness’. Clear-cut behaviours in 
response to regressive transfers lifting an individual out of poverty are hence warranted. 
  
3. The BF index and crossings of the poverty threshold 
Consider a fixed and finite set of individuals { }1,2,...,A n=  and let 01 2( , ,..., )n ny y y y >= ∈ℝ  be the 
corresponding vector of incomes arranged in non-decreasing order, where yi is the income of the ith  
individual. Take an exogenous poverty line 0z >∈ℝ  and define the individuals in the subset 
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{ }1, 2,...,Q q N= ⊆  with Q q=  as poor. We adopt the weak definition of the poor: yq is the largest 
income smaller than z.3 Let a function 0 0 0( ; ) : nP y z > > ≥× →ℝ ℝ ℝ  evaluate aggregate poverty as a 
normalized sum of deprivation values. The FGT and the BF class of poverty measures are, 
respectively: 
(1) 
,
1
1( ; )
n
i
i
P y z P
n
α α
=
= ∑ , with 
( )
,
0( ; )
0 ,
i i
i
i
if y z
P y z
if y z
α
α
 Γ < <
= 
≥
 
where 0α ≥∈ℝ  is interpreted by the authors as a parameter of poverty aversion, and 
(2) 
, , ,
1
1( ; )
n
i
i
P y z P
n
α δ α δ
=
= ∑ , with 
( )
, ,
0( ; )
0 ,
i i
i
i
if y z
P y z
if y z
α
α δ
δ + Γ < <
= 
≥
 
where ii
z y
z
−Γ = , 0δ >∈ℝ  and α  receives the same interpretation as in iP ,α  but is taken to exceed 
unity in order to enjoy the larger set of properties associated to strict convexity below z. Clearly we 
have:  
(3) 
, ,
1
1 q
i
i
P P H P
n
α δ α αδ δ
=
 = + = + ∑ . 
 For a regressive transfer, call the increase in the welfare loss from poverty of the donor D
+∆  and 
the decrease in the welfare loss from poverty of the recipient R
−∆ . We normally consider D R
+ −∆ > ∆ : the 
net effect of the regressive transfer is an increased welfare loss from poverty. In the case of a line 
crossing, R
−∆  may be thought larger than D
+∆ , entailing a gain overall rather than a loss. Given 
convexity, the satisfaction of the inequality D R
+ −∆ < ∆  is not of interest when the recipient remains 
poor. 
                                                 
3
 In BF’s discrete model, there are no ties and nobody is located at the poverty line (xi < xi+1 œi and xQ < Z < xQ+1). In their 
model with continuously distributed incomes, positive density is allowed in a neighbourhood of the poverty line. FGT admit 
the possibility of people at the poverty line, and count such people as poor even though their presence has no impact on their 
index when 0 (since 0 for 0)lim
0
α α
α
> = >Γ
Γ→
. When α = 0, FGT say that their index reduces to the headcount ratio, but 
00
since lim 1 and 0  is indeterminate,
0
Γ =
Γց
there is a problem with this.  
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 Distribution-sensitive measures depict poverty as getting harsher at increasing rates the further 
we get below the poverty line - assuming differentiability, 
2
2 0
i
P
y
∂
>
∂
 in the “poor” domain. As a 
consequence, for a regressive transfer the inequality D R
+ −∆ > ∆  is always verified for  continuous 
distribution-sensitive indices such as 1Pα > . The reason why such indices always increase is that they 
only deal with variable losses from poverty, while, conversely, 0Pα =  remains unchanged because it 
instead deals only with the fixed loss. 
 Jump-discontinuous distribution-sensitive indices such as 
,
Pα δ  always increase if the recipient 
remains poor - thus satisfying RTA. In such cases the ‘fixed’ loss from poverty is not affected. 
However, once we consider transfers that take the recipient over the poverty threshold, R
−∆  can be 
written as Rδ −+ ∆ɶ , where R−∆ɶ  represents the variable component of the variation. The condition 
2
2 0
i
P
y
∂
>
∂
 ensures that 0D R
+ −∆ − ∆ = ∆ >ɶ ɶ  but is silent on the sign of δ∆ = ∆ −ɶ . The potential for the BF 
class to accommodate different views on regressive transfers lifting the recipient out of poverty rests in 
the possibility to unequivocally determine the sign of ∆ . The determination of a clear-cut behaviour of 
the index on such occasions may be considered indeed as a sensible motivation driving the choice of 
the value of the parameter δ , which the developers of the measure have left at the analyst’s discretion. 
The satisfaction of RA requires 0∆ < . It is straightforward to see that this condition is always 
met for appropriate values RAδ , in fact whenever 1RAδ ≥  since unity is the least upper bound of 1,iPα >  
and consequently the ceiling to ∆ɶ . Hence, the use of 
, 1Pα δ ≥  would allow a potentially very interesting 
behaviour: the accommodation of value judgements motivating RA whilst avoiding the ‘crudeness’ of 
0Pα = . 
 The satisfaction of UTA requires 0∆ > , or, equivalently, δ∆ >ɶ . Because of the completeness 
property of real numbers, this condition cannot be met by an ‘exogenous’ δ . In fact, however small we 
choose a δ , we can always throw from the set of real numbers an infinity of couples of numbers ay  
and by  representing the income values of donor and recipient such that ,a b δ∆ <ɶ . However, thanks to 
the same property of the real numbers, UTA can be accommodated through the choice of an 
‘endogenous’ δ , i.e. a δ  depending on the actual income values. In fact, once the income distribution 
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is given, so are the possible values of ∆ɶ , and we can throw from the set of real numbers an infinity of 
'sδ  smaller than the minimum value of ∆ɶ . Consider the problem as follows. 
 Call I  the set whose elements are the possible increments of 1Pα >  as a consequence of a 
regressive transfer lifting the recipient out of poverty - i.e. the set of possible 's∆ɶ  - in the realm of 
0
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ,..., )n ny y y y >= ∈ℝ , where yˆ  is the realized income vector in society. Also, let ( )P y⌣  be the 
poverty value associated with income y⌣  and let it  indicate i’s income shortfall from the poverty line - 
i.e. the minimum magnitude of a transfer able to lift i out of poverty. By choosing 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )UTA q q q q q qP y t P y P yδ + −− − −< ∆ − ∆ = − − −  it is possible to jointly accommodate UTA and value 
judgements in favour of a “fixed-plus-variable” loss from poverty motivating the BF class, because of 
the following general result: 
PROPOSITION 1. Given a value of α , the set I has a minimum, which occurs when the donor is person 
1q −  and the recipient is person q . 
For the proof of this result, see the Appendix. 
 One may surely question the analytical as well as the empirical attractiveness of the above 
condition. On the one hand, the endogenous character of UTAδ  makes it a less elegant result if 
compared with the predetermined form of RAδ ; on the other hand, for populations with individuals very 
close to the poverty line, UTAδ  may happen to be very small, constraining the value the analyst can 
assign to the fixed loss from poverty. 
 Nevertheless, even in cases in which UTAδ  should turn out to be very small, it would at least 
correct the idiosyncratic values reflecting the variable loss by a common fixed loss from poverty; and, 
as will be illustrated below, a simple application of our new methodology shows that such constraint is 
not as harsh as it may appear. Furthermore, the use of an inelegant formulation might be preferred to an 
undesired trade-off between UTA and the belief in a ‘fixed-plus-variable’ loss. Finally, the spreadsheet 
computability of UTAδ  would be straightforward and when comparing income distributions A, B, … the 
use of min( , ,...)UTA UTAA Bδ δ  will be consistent. 
 As a Corollary, for all 'sδ such that 1UTAδ δ< ≤ , there exists for every potential recipient j a 
‘threshold’ differentiating individuals poorer than him according to whether a ‘sacrifice’ of magnitude 
jt  from such a person is or is not worthwhile from a social welfare point of view. The idiosyncratic 
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threshold levels referred to here are evidently functions of the degree of poverty aversion exhibited by 
the distribution-sensitive measure. Each individual threshold would provide a ‘case by case’ 
identification of what Sen in the quoted passage refers to as ‘under certain circumstances’. 
 Finally, in this section, we apply our analytical results to the income distribution y cited at the 
start of the paper. As may be easily verified, when 1δ ≥  any regressive transfer decreasing the number 
of the poor leads to a decrement of the BF index for any α , according to the prescriptions of RA. 
When in the BF class 2α = , the choice of any 0.04δ <  will allow the accommodation of UTA, 
ranking distribution y as having less poverty than any distribution y* obtained from y through any 
regressive transfer. When 3α = , any 0.018δ <  will do. These may look like heavy constraints at first 
sight. In order to correctly appreciate their severity, however, one should consider them relative to the 
magnitude of the variable component of the 
, ,iPα δ  value – namely, the ,iPα  value. Once we do that, we 
see that for 2α =  the upper bound value UTAδ  = 0.04 is the quadruple of 2,i qPα = = , and for 3α =  the 
bounding value UTAδ  = 0.018 is eighteen times the relevant magnitude. The relative severity of such 
constraints decreases rapidly for larger 'sα . 
 
4.   Some light on the third ‘I’, and the case for a fourth ‘I’ of poverty 
In the introductory section, we called the reader’s attention to a regressive transfer turning distribution 
y = ($4, $7, $8, $9, $20, $30) into distribution y"' = ($4, $4, $10, $10, $20, $30). Poverty indices 
informative on only the incidence of poverty decrease; those informative on only the intensity of 
poverty remain unchanged. We asked: given that the inequality among the poor has decreased, how 
come that a composite measure informative on all three ‘I’s, such as 2Pα = , signals an increase in 
poverty? As a matter of fact, the introduction of the third ‘I’ into the picture reverses completely the 
poverty ordering – and in a direction, moreover, which is curiously opposite to the change in the third 
‘I’ itself! Indeed, the third ‘I’ appears to be an irrelevant dimension of aggregate poverty if the ceteris-
paribus assumption does not apply to both the incidence and intensity dimensions. While poverty 
orderings based on either of the first two ‘I’s alone are, though ‘crude’, justified according to some 
sensible views on poverty, the same cannot be said with respect to the inequality among the poor. Such 
an ordering would be vulnerable to well-founded criticisms, among which is, of course, the well-known 
“levelling-down objection”.4 
                                                 
4
 According to this, equality obtained by making somebody worse-off and nobody better-off is a loss. 
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 The point is not that the ordering induced by 2Pα =  lacks the support of sensible views on 
poverty, but that such views have very little to do with equality. The axioms concerning transfers 
among poor individuals should not be thought of as having been lifted from inequality measurement 
theory. The increment to the index from a regressive transfer does not derive from an egalitarian view, 
valuing equality per se, but stems from a prioritarian attitude originating in the more general principle 
of vertical equity, “calling for an appropriate differentiation among unequals” (Musgrave, 1990: 113). 
And as Broome (2007) remarks, such an attitude “leads them [prioritarians] to value equality 
indirectly” (p. 1). 
 The α -weighting of normalized income shortfalls within the sub-class 1Pα >  can be associated 
with the concept of prioritarianism on a twofold basis. Firstly, the members of this  sub-class assign 
larger weights to lower poor incomes relative to higher poor incomes, implementing de facto a 
prioritarian weighting scheme - see Vallentyne (2003). When α  is increased, the importance of worse-
off individuals relative to those who are better-off grows. For example, the importance of the third 
worst-off individual increases relative to that of individuals 4,…,q but decreases relative to that of the 
worst-off and second worst-off; clearly, the worst-off individual sees his own importance increase 
relative to that of all other poor. Secondly, the reason which motivates such weighting scheme, when 
measuring absolute poverty, very closely reflects the peculiar feature of prioritarianism as expressed in 
the seminal work (Parfit, 1995): what matters is that “these people are at a lower absolute level. It is 
irrelevant that these people are worse off than others  … [but] rather that they are worse off than they 
might have been”  (p. 23). 
 By means of which α ≥ 1 should we choose to prioritize worse-off individuals? Finite values of 
α  induce forms of finitely weighted prioritarianism, whereas in the limit, as α → ∞ , the kind of 
prioritarianism involved is leximin, which follows precisely Vallentyne’s identification of leximin 
weighting, in which, between two individuals, “infinitely greater weight [is given] to a worse-off 
person” (2003, p. 9); and within the whole population, to the worst-off person.5,6 
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 It is straightforward to show that  lim ( ) ( )i j i jα αα< ⇒ Γ Γ =∞→∞  and lim ( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )1 qi j j
α α α α
α
 
 
 
Γ Γ + Γ + + Γ =∞+→∞
. 
Multiplying numerator and denominator by 1 ( )j
αΓ ,  the result becomes evident. 
6
 A fundamental difference between leximin and maximin, stressed by Vallentyne (2003), is that the latter gives absolutely 
no importance to the second worst-off, whereas the former requires that: 1) the situation of the worst-off should be 
enhanced as much as possible; 2) to the extent that the implementation of 1) allows, the situation of the second worst-off 
should be enhanced as much as possible, and so on with the third worst-off, fourth worst-off, etc. For Pα , we could only 
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 Looking at the relative individual contributions to the aggregate poverty value - i.e. at the 
fraction 
, 1/ [ ... ... ]i i i qP P α α α αα α = Γ Γ + + Γ + + Γ - it is easy to see that the only individual whose share is 
always monotonically increasing in α  is the worst-off, however income is distributed. When the 
poverty aversion parameter α grows indefinitely, only the poorest person of all tends to matter.7 The 
three I’s of poverty become virtually irrelevant now, and the poverty ordering of two income 
distributions becomes based on a different dimension, namely the condition of the poorest. We name 
this dimension the injustice of poverty - hence a fourth ‘I’ of poverty - in conformity with Rawls’ 
(1971) theory of justice entailing a special concern for the least advantaged. 
 Considering the injustice dimension of poverty together with the other three dimensions is of 
evident interest, especially in the realm of a more authentically “Rawlsian” approach to evaluation. 
Atkinson (1987), Vallentyne (2000) and Tungodden and Vallentyne (2006) all emphasise the 
misidentification, especially by economists, of the subset of society to whom Rawls (1971) addresses 
his difference principle.8 While the “least advantaged” is generally intended as strictly the worst-off 
individual in society, what Rawls really refers to is the least advantaged group. Once an appropriate 
cut-off function identifying the least advantaged group is set, the latter may turn out to be relatively 
large, and information on its condition may consequently gain a certain interest.  
 
5.  ‘I’s of poverty, prioritarianism and distributional properties in the FGT and BF classes 
Bourguignon and Fields (1997) see their class as enjoying desirable properties related to those of 1Pα >  
“while also combining with them the insight reflected in the headcount ratio on the loss from being 
poor” (p. 156). Indeed, the augmentation of 1,iPα >  by a fixed loss from poverty induces an increase in 
the relative importance of the incidence dimension over the other dimensions of aggregate poverty. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
have full maximin if we could consider comparisons - entailing either individuals or whole groups - between the poor on the 
one side and the nonpoor on the other side. However Pα  is a focused measure. Therefore, there can be no maximin-like 
relationships  in the concern expressed by Pα  for poor individuals having different incomes.  
7
 Rearranging the poorest persons’s share as 1
, 1 2 1 3 1 1/ [1 ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ]i qP P α α αα α −= = + Γ Γ + Γ Γ + + Γ Γ , one can see 
immediately that 
,1lim ( ) 1P Pα α
α →∞
= . 
8
 In addition, Atkinson (1987) interestingly observes that the difference principle has nothing to do with poverty per se, and 
remarks that poverty would more naturally enter Rawls’ theoretical framework through his first principle. In fact, the 
argument in the difference principle is an ordinal one, and the least advantaged may be well above the poverty line; instead, 
the first principle postulates priority to be given to the basic liberties, a necessary condition for which can be identified in a 
minimum income level. However, whenever the set of the poor is a non-empty set, then the difference principle is surely of 
interest to the extent that the least advantaged is below the poverty line. 
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Precisely such higher weight on the incidence of poverty is the factor enabling the corresponding BF 
measure 
,
Pα δ  to depart from UTA in cases in which the number of poor people is affected by an 
income transfer. 
 At the individual level, the inclusion of the parameter δ  delivers a mitigation of the prioritarian 
attitude inherent in the choice of an 1α > . Moreover, since the 
,iPα  value approaches zero as α → ∞ , 
in 
,
Pα δ  only the fixed loss “survives” when α  grows indefinitely. At the limit, the discriminative 
attitude towards different poor income levels completely vanishes and the poor individuals end up 
counting all equally, independently of their income levels, exactly as when 0α = . The poorest person 
of all is no exception to that. As we can see from Figure 1, for α → ∞ , while in Pα  the share of the 
poorest in aggregate poverty approaches unity, in 
,
Pα δ  it tends down to 1/q as for the headcount. It 
follows that for 
,
,  Pα δα → ∞  has the same informational content as the headcount. Figure 1 also shows 
a new index, Pγ
∞
, plotted against its parameter γ , to which we shall come shortly. 
 
Fig. 1: Contribution of the poorest to aggregate poverty : FGT, BF, H and Pγ∞ . 
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 As we have already explained, the choice of the poverty aversion parameter α  informs the way 
the aggregate measure takes into account the four ‘I’s of poverty. Each member of the FGT and BF 
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classes with 1 α< < ∞  is informative on all four ‘I’s, and the choice of an α  within that range may be 
thought of as reflecting a certain degree of ‘finitely weighted prioritarianism’. This choice in turn 
determines the distributional properties possessed by the index. As shown in Fishburn (1980) and 
Fishburn and Willig (1984), successively higher transfer principles are linked with correspondingly 
higher moments of distributions and welfare functions - in our case, welfare-loss functions - whose 
derivatives alternate in sign. Once we pass from the distribution of incomes 1 2( , ,..., )qy y y y=  to that of 
the normalized poverty gaps 1 2( , ,..., )qΓ = Γ Γ Γ  - as we have already implicitly done in our discussion - 
Fishburn’s results are directly applicable to the FGT and BF classes. Members of such classes are in 
fact built upon the power functions 
,
( )i iP αα = Γ , so that, for integer 'sα , the aggregate value Pα  
corresponds to the thα  moment of the distribution of poverty gaps. Larger 'sα  are thus associated with 
higher degrees of transfer sensitivity.  
PROPOSITION 2.  Within the FGT and BF classes, there is no highest  level of transfer sensitivity:  
* *
' *
,
,  such that  and PP
α α δα α∀ ∃ accommodate a higher level of transfer sensitivity than do ' ' , and P Pα α δ  
respectively. 
Proof. If ' (1, )α ∈ ∞  then * * ':α α α∃ > , and the proof follows from Fishburn’s results. If ' {0,1, }α ∈ ∞  
then the statement holds * *:1α α∀ < < ∞ , since none of 0 1,  and P P Pα α α= = →∞  are distribution sensitive; 
equally for 
,
Pα δ→∞ . QED. 
 Hence there is no upper limit to the assignation of transfer sensitivity to the FGT and BF 
indices. Actually, if we follow a suggestion of Zheng (1993), to quantify the welfare loss from poverty 
in simple percentage terms (“as… other index developers have done” (p. 84)), specifically by the 
ratio
i
z
y
, then, we see, all four ‘I’s  of poverty are accommodated as well as the highest degrees of 
transfer sensitivity: 
PROPOSITION 3. A poverty measure whose individual deprivation function is the percentage welfare loss 
from poverty 
i
z
y
 is informative on all four ‘I’s of poverty and satisfies transfer sensitivity at the highest 
level.  
 - 14 - 
Proof.  1 0 1 2 3
0
1(1 ) ... lim ( )
1
M
i
i i i i iM
i i i
z yz z
y y z z z
α
α
−
→∞
=
−
= = − = = Γ + Γ + Γ + Γ + = Γ
+ − − Γ ∑
. QED  
6. The individual deprivation function in scale-invariant poverty indices 
Define iP
∞
= 
i
z
y
. The significance of Proposition 3 is considerable. For as Foster and Shorrocks (1991: 
701) and Zheng (1993: 85) have each pointed out,  all decomposable and scale invariant poverty 
indices take the general form P = 
1
( )
q
i
i
a Pϕ ∞
=
∑  where, indeed, the individual loss-from-poverty 
contribution is a transformation of the percentage welfare loss iP
∞
 of Proposition 3.9 Consequently, if, 
for poverty measures generally the choice of the functional form of the individual deprivation function 
affects the informational content of the aggregate index in respect of the four ‘I’s of poverty, as well as 
its distributional properties, for decomposable scale-invariant measures a more precise interpretation is 
now available.  The transformation inherent in ( )ϕ ⋅  may be thought of as a tool, on the one hand, 
restraining the degree of transfer sensitivity of the index relative to the degree inherent in 
1
( )
q
i
i
a Pϕ ∞
=
∑  
when ( )ϕ ⋅  is the identity function; on the other hand, possibly decreasing the number of ‘I’s of poverty 
which the index takes into account, transforming the four-‘I’s-informative index into, for example, a 
one-‘I’-informative index such as H or the leximin poverty gap. 
 The effect of ( )ϕ ⋅  on the degree of transfer sensitivity of the index has to do merely with the 
curvature of the individual deprivation function for (0, )y z∈ . But, recalling the discussion in Section 
3, the informational content of the index on the ‘I’s of poverty is crucially affected also by the  
behaviour of the individual deprivation function at the poverty line. That, in turns, informs the response 
of the index to transfer-led line-crossings. Rewriting iP
∞
 as 1i iP P
∞ ∞
= + ɶ , one can see how iP
∞
 is a 
                                                 
9
 For example, if the decomposable relative poverty index is represented by the FGT class itself, then we can write 
(1 ) ( )
,
y ziPi
z yi
α ϕα = − = , where ( ){ }( ) h g fϕ ⋅ = ⋅    with 
1
( ) zf
yi
−
⋅ =
 
 
 
, ( ) 1 ( )g f⋅ = − ⋅  and ( ) [ ( )]h g α⋅ = ⋅ . By 
applying to ( )h ⋅  the function ( ) ( )l hδ⋅ = + ⋅  one obtains the BF contribution function. If ( )ϕ ⋅  is the logarithmic function, 
then ( , )P y zi i  becomes the individual loss-from-poverty function for the Watts (1968) poverty index, 
log log log
zWP z yi i yi
= − = . 
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poverty-line-discontinuous, monotonic and distribution sensitive index melding fixed and variable 
losses from poverty precisely according to BF’s prescriptions, where the fixed loss equals one and the 
variable loss is expressed by 
1
lim ( )
M
i iM
P α
α
∞
→∞
=
= Γ∑ɶ  - which clearly satisfies transfer sensitivity at the 
highest level. It follows that ( )ϕ ⋅  is, for various indices, a transformation apt to depart from the ‘fixed-
plus-variable’ approach in favor of unrestricted continuity and to depart from RTA in favor of UTA. 
For those indices, a condition such as (1) 0ϕ =  will be verified, which means that the individual 
deprivation function will intersect the horizontal axis when iy z= . Monotonicity turns the question of 
the intersection of the individual deprivation function with the vertical axis into an investigation of its 
upper-boundedness. Since iP
∞
, as well as the deprivation function inherent in the Watts index, is not 
bounded above - which is not the case for the entire family in Hagenaars (1987), to which the FGT and 
BF classes themselves can be ascribed - it is evident that ( )ϕ ⋅  may also serve to put a ceiling upon the 
scale-invariant index, allowing a predeterminable condition for the accommodation of RA.  
 Finally, we recall Sen’s (1976) Axiom N, according to which in the case of a perfectly 
egalitarian distribution of incomes below the poverty line, an index fully informative on the relevant 
dimensions of aggregate poverty is given by HI, in his own words a “simple” and “arbitrary” 
multiplicative form between the indices H and I (p. 227). Following along this line a, simple and 
arbitrary, ( )ϕ ⋅  taking a multiplicative form between two well-known indices may be used to take into 
account the relevant dimensions of poverty when poor incomes differ. Once more using the algebra of 
geometric series, 1 2
,
( , ) ... ( )
1
i
i i i i i i i
i i
zP P P
y
γ
γ γ γ γ
γϕ γ∞ + + ∞
Γ
= Γ + Γ + Γ + = = Γ =
− Γ
 is the individual 
deprivation function of such a decomposable index, which we name Pγ
∞
. This can be seen as a 
parametric generalization of iP
∞
 and iP
∞ɶ
 in which γ  indicates both the lowest degree of transfer 
sensitivity and the “softest” degree of prioritarianism included in the measure. If 1γ ≥ , only the 
variable loss from poverty is taken into account and the index will enjoy continuity-related properties; 
if 0γ =  the individual deprivation function is discontinuous reflecting the belief in the existence of a 
fixed loss from poverty alongside the variable loss. And the larger is γ , the larger is the relative weight 
on the fourth “I” of poverty. As can be seen in Figure 1, for correspondent values of α  and γ  the 
concern for the poorest is larger in Pγ
∞
 than in Pα . Along the lines we comprehensively discussed in 
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this paper, this can be seen as the result of a more ‘prioritarian’ attitude of the index at the individual 
level, where person i’s deprivation function for a certain γ  is given by the correspondent 
,iPα , with the 
additional weight iP
∞
 being the relative welfare loss from poverty.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
In the BF class, individual losses from poverty are aggregated using chosen values of the parameters α  
and δ . Significant consequences stem from the analyst’s choices of α  and δ . As we have argued, the 
α -weighting at the individual level can be read in terms of prioritarianism, and the δ -value 
determines whether, and to what extent, a fixed loss from poverty is to be taken into account. Such 
choices are shown to affect the informational content of the aggregate index on Sen’s three ‘I’s of 
poverty. The re-examination of those ‘I’s not only led us to a discussion on how to view the inequality 
dimension, but also it fostered our conceptualization of a fourth ‘I’. The injustice of poverty, 
corresponding closely with Rawls’s concern for the least advantaged, should, to our eyes, be formally 
admitted into the picture of the poverty dimensions that are relevant for poverty evaluation. 
Passing from the income distribution [vector 1( ,..., )qy y y= ] to the distribution of the 
normalized poverty gaps [vector 1( ,..., )qΓ = Γ Γ ], a close association is possible between the members 
of the BF and FGT classes for integer values of α  and the moments of that latter distribution, with 
well-known links to transfer properties. This led to our perspective on the wide family of subgroup-
decomposable scale-invariant poverty indices, not seen before, and to a new understanding of the role 
of the individual deprivation function in this family.  
Not least, we investigated alternative value judgements behind different behaviours of a poverty 
index when the poverty line is crossed, and we showed how within the BF class a number of visions 
can be accommodated through an appropriate choice of its parameters. Ethical flexibility has been 
added, so that that additional possibilities for making poverty comparisons arise, bringing opportunities 
for deeper research and wider scope for cogent measurement. 
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Appendix:  the proof of Proposition 1  
The increment D R
+ −∆ − ∆  to 1Pα >  following the transfer of an amount t will be minimum when the 
transfer exactly fills the recipient’s gap from the poverty line: the transfer of any larger amount merely 
creates an increase in D
+∆  with no effect on R
−∆  (because 1Pα >  is a focused poverty measure). Hence 
without loss of generality we consider transfers exactly filling the recipient’s shortfall from the poverty 
line. Proposition 1 asserts that 1  ,q q i h i i
+ − + −
− −
∆ − ∆ < ∆ − ∆ ∀   { }1, 2,..., 1h i∈ − , or, equivalently, that: 
  
 1 1
,,,, 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
RDRD
q q q q i h i i h i
R iD i hR qD q
P y t P y P y P y t P y P y i
−+
−+
− − − −
∆ =∆ = −∆ =∆ = −
− − − < − − − ∀
		
, 
where qt  and it  correspond to the income shortfalls from the poverty line of, respectively, the richest 
poor and the ith poor. Since 
2
2 0
i
P
y
∂
>
∂
, the RHS increases with it  and h : the more “distant” are the donor 
and recipient in the RHS, the larger is the RHS. Hence it is enough to establish the inequality for the 
smallest possible values of it  and h . We consequently take 0h =
10
 and i = q-1 (so that 1i qt t −=  is the 
smallest it  after qt , which is what we have on the LHS). The inequality becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1P y t P y P y P y t P y P yq qq q q q q q− − − < − − −− − − − − − , or ( ) ( )1 1 1P y t P y tqq q q− − −− − −   
( ) ( )1P y P yqq> −− . Now consider the differences in the arguments of (.)P on the LHS and RHS of this 
last inequality. They are the same, because 1 1q qt z y− −= −  and q qt z y= − . The  inequality is verified 
because 
2
20 and 0
i i
P P
y y
∂ ∂
< >
∂ ∂
. Q. E. D. 
 
                                                 
10
 Clearly, if h = 0 the transfer should not be called “regressive”. However, this choice makes it clear that the distance 
between the donor and the recipient in the RHS is minimized. 
